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h i g h l i g h t s
• Denmark passed a tax reform in May 2009 taking effect from the beginning of 2010.
• The reform lowered the tax rate on top bracket taxable income from 63% to 56%.
• This increased pensions savings before the change in taxation was enacted.
• Savings in tax deferred pension accounts as well as total pension savings increased.
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a b s t r a c t
A Danish tax reform, passed in May 2009 and taking effect from the beginning of 2010, lowered the
marginal tax rate on top bracket taxable income from 63% to 56%. Because contributions to pension
accounts are tax deductible, the reform provided an incentive to increase pension contributions before
the change in taxation. Using high frequency panel data, we document a temporary increase in pension
contributions in the second half of 2009 in response to the anticipated change in taxation, and that this
led to an increase in total savings in this period. The response is driven by less than 5% of those affected
by the policy.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
It is a long-standing topic of interest whether tax incentives
effectively increase savings at the individual level, but due to
a lack of high quality data on savings the economic literature
has struggled to provide decisive answers (Bernheim, 2002). In
a recent paper, Chetty et al. (2014) use high quality annual data
on savings for the Danish population to show that a permanent
change in the tax subsidy to pension contributions is ineffective at
increasing savings in private pension accounts. A small minority
of people shift their savings to other accounts when the tax
incentives are changed, while the large majority do not respond at
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0/).all. A hitherto neglected temporary tax incentive for saving in tax
deferred accounts arises in connection with the announcement of
income tax reforms that change the value of future tax deductions
by altering themarginal tax rate (MTR).We use a recent tax reform
in Denmark as a natural experiment to identify the short run
behavioral response to an anticipated change in taxes by exploiting
a new data source with information of pensions contributions at
the monthly frequency.
2. The 2010 Danish tax reform, data, and method
The Danish tax system consists of proportional taxes (a regional
tax, a church tax, a labor market tax, and a bottom bracket
income tax) and a progressive schedule on top of that. In 2009
the proportional taxes amounted to 43.5% and the progressive
schedule consisted of a middle bracket tax rate of 6% and a top
bracket tax rate of 15%. The middle and top tax brackets applied
to income above DKK 377,000 (one USD corresponds to around
le under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.
C.T. Kreiner et al. / Economics Letters 150 (2017) 104–107 105DKK 6.5). A tax reform, passed by parliament on May 28, 2009 and
taking effect from January 1, 2010, removed the middle bracket
tax and increased the top-tax threshold to DKK 424,000. The tax
reform lowered theMTR from almost 63% to 56% for people paying
top taxeswhile leaving themarginal tax rate practically unchanged
for others.1 Because contributions to pension savings accounts are
deductible the reform gave an incentive during the announcement
period to advance pension contributions to 2009while the tax rate
was high.
The Danish pension system consists of three components
that are typical of retirement savings systems in developed
countries: a state-provided defined benefit (DB) plan (analogous to
Social Security in the United States), employer organized defined
contribution (DC) accounts (analogous to 401(k)s in the United
States), and privately organized DC accounts (analogous to IRAs
in the United States). 90% of all DC contributions are made to
employer organized accounts. For further details, see Chetty et al.
(2014). In Denmark, as in the US, there is increased reliance on DC
schemes and this raises the interest in understanding the factors
determining these contributions.
Our analysis is based on a new administrative register (called
the eIncome register) with monthly information from employers
about wages, salaries and contributions to employer organized
pension accounts for all employees in Denmark. We have access
to data covering the 48 months from January 2008 to December
2011. The eIncome register contains the identification number of
the employee, whichwe use to link the data to annual recordswith
additional information about financial wealth.
To identify the effect of the reform on pension contributions
during 2009, we split the sample into taxpayers who experienced
a reduction in their MTR and taxpayers who did not, where
people are allocated to a tax bracket based on income in 2008.
The treatment group (T-group) includes employees with monthly
gross earnings above DKK 35,000 in 2008, roughly the 75th
percentile of the income distribution. The control group (C-group)
includes individuals with a monthly income in the range DKK
30,000–35,000.
Our sample consists of all individuals who are employed in the
private sector, and where we have 48 consecutive observations
from January 2008 to December 2011 with positive wage income.
We further limit the sample to individuals with contributions to
annuity pension schemes of less than DKK 100,000 in 2008.2 The
final sample consists of 116,724 individuals in the T-group and
64,287 individuals in the C-group.
3. Results
Fig. 1, panel A displays the average monthly contribution rate
– measured in proportion to total monthly gross payments to
the individual – to employer organized pension accounts. The
contribution rate for the C-group is more or less constant at a level
of 4.5% throughout the observation period. For the T-group the
level is slightly higher. More importantly, there is a spike in the
contribution rate towards the end of 2009. This is consistent with
1 Formally, there is a gross labor market contribution (LMC), a regional tax (RT ),
a bottom tax (BT ), a middle tax (MT ), a top tax (TT ), and a church tax (CT ). Before
January 1, 2010 the marginal tax rate for a top taxpayer was MTR = LMC + (1 −
LMC) × (RT + BT + MT + TT + CT ) = 8 + (100 − 8) × (32.8 + 5.04 + 6 +
15+ 0.7) ≃ 63%. After January 1, 2010 the marginal tax rate for a top taxpayer was
MTR = 8 + (100 − 8) × (32.8 + 3.67 + 0 + 15 + 0.7) ≃ 56%. See Kreiner et al.
(2016) for more details about the tax system and the 2010 reform.
2 The latter selection is imposed because the tax deductibility for contributions
to annuity schemes was capped at DKK 100,000 from 2010, and we want to avoid
interference from this rule change when measuring the effect of the change in the
marginal tax rate on contributions in 2009.the tax incentive to increase payments while the deduction rate is
still at a high level.
The graph does not reveal whether the effect is driven by many
individuals who change their contributions a little, or whether
it is driven by a few individuals who change their contributions
a lot. In order to identify individuals who made extraordinarily
large pension contributions, we construct a dummy indicator
that equals one for an individual if the pension contribution
rate in December 2009 is 25 percentage points higher than its
level in December 2008.3 Panel B of Fig. 1 is similar to panel A
with the exception that the treatment group is divided into a
group consisting of individuals who made extraordinarily large
contributions according to the dummy indicator (T-group2) and
another group consisting of individuals who did not (T-group1).
4818 persons made extraordinary contributions according to this
definition, andpanel B shows that the entire increase in the average
monthly rate of pension contribution from panel A is driven by the
group who made extraordinary contributions.
Fig. 1 documents higher contributions to employer organized
pension accounts, but it does not reveal whether this increase
is offset by reduced savings in other accounts. We address this
issue in Table 1, which is based on annual data from the income-
tax register on savings in privately organized retirement savings
accounts and in financial assets in each of the years 2006–2011.
To quantify the effect of the increased contributions to employer
organized accounts on savings in privately organized pension
savings accounts, we estimate the following equation
PPrivit = β0 + β1Dt + β2PEmplit + µi + uit (1)
where PPrivit are contributions to privately organized pension sav-
ings accounts in year t measured as a fraction of total annual gross
payments, Dt is a vector of year dummies, P
Empl
it are contributions
to employer organized accounts measured as a fraction of total an-
nual gross payments, µi is an individual specific effect, which is
potentially correlated with the explanatory variables, and uit is an
error term. The parameter of interest β2 measures the effect of in-
creasing contributions to employer organized accounts on contri-
butions to privately organized accounts. We instrument PEmplit us-
ing the interaction D2009 × DTreati where the indicator DTreati is one
for individuals belonging to the treatment group. This isolates the
changes in contributions to employer organized accounts that are
related to the anticipated tax change.
Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1 present the results from the
estimation. Column (1) is based on the full sample. The results
show that when contributions to employer organized accounts
increase by one unit then contributions to privately organized
accounts increase by 0.156 units. The positive coefficient means
that contributions to employer accounts crowd in contributions to
private accounts. Crowding in is expected since the tax incentive
also applies to private accounts. In column (2) we limit the
treatment group to include only the 4818 individuals who made
extraordinary contributions to their employer organized accounts.
The parameter estimate from this regression based on the T-
group2 and the C-group is smaller, showing that the group
contributing extraordinarily to employer organized accounts is
only partially overlapping with the group that contributes extra to
privately organized accounts.
Finally, we estimate the effect of the total increase in
contributions to tax favored pension savings accounts, i.e. both
employer organized and privately organized accounts, on savings
3 Results are very similar if we use other thresholds than 25 percentage points
or use a dummy indicator that equals one if an individual has extraordinarily high
contribution rates in any of the months after the reform was decided.
106 C.T. Kreiner et al. / Economics Letters 150 (2017) 104–107Fig. 1. Contributions to employer organized retirement savings accounts.
Notes: Panel A and B show average monthly contributions to employer organized pension accounts as a share of total gross payments for the T-group and C-group (Panel
A) and T-Group1, T-group2 and the C-group (Panel B). The C-group (64,287) includes all private sector employees with average monthly wage income in the range DKK
30,000–35,000 in 2008, contributions to annuity pension schemes of less than DKK 100,000 in 2008, and (48) registered monthly wage payments from January 2008 to
December 2011. The T-group (116,724) includes all private sector employeeswith averagemonthlywage income aboveDKK35,000 in 2008, contributions to annuity pension
schemes of less than DKK 100,000 in 2008, and (48) registered monthly wage payments from January 2008 to December 2011. T-group2 (4818) includes all individuals from
the T-group whose contribution rate in December 2009 was at least 25 percentage points higher than their contribution rate in December 2008. The T-group1 includes
members of the T-group who are not included in T-group2.Table 1
Effect of the tax reform on savings in privately organized retirement accounts and on savings in financial assets.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable PPriv PPriv S S
PEmpl 0.156*** 0.050***
[0.126,0.186] [0.042,0.057]
PTotPen −0.650 −0.086
[−1.362,0.063] [−0.222,0.050]
Observations 1,069,320 408,702 1,069,320 408,702
Notes: 95% confidence intervals reported in square brackets. These are based on standard errors which are clustered at the individual level.
Columns (1) and (2) present estimates of β2 from Eq. (1) and columns (3) and (4) present estimates of α2 from Eq. (2). PEmpl and PTotPen are
instrumented with Di,2009 × DTreati . Estimates in column (1) and (2) are based on the full sample. Estimates in columns (2) and (4) include
only those individuals in the treatment group who made extraordinary contributions to employer organized retirement accounts before
the reform, here defined as having a pension contribution rate measured in proportion to total gross payments in December 2009 that is
25 percentage points higher than its level in December 2008. All regressions include year dummies and control for individual fixed effects.
*** Indicates that the coefficient is significant at a 0.1% level.in financial assets by running the following regression
Sit = α0 + α1Dt + α2PTotPenit + θi + vit (2)
where Sit is savings in financial assets relative to total gross
payments. The income tax register records financial wealth at
the end of the year and savings in financial wealth is then
approximated by the difference between financial wealth in year
t and year t − 1. Dt is a vector of year dummies and PTotPenit are
total contributions to tax subsidized retirement savings accounts
measured as a fraction of total annual gross payments, which is
instrumentedusing the interactionD2009×DTreati . Column (3) shows
estimates for the full sample and column (4) shows estimates
for the sample where the treatment group only consists of the
4818 individuals who made extraordinary contributions to their
employer organized retirement savings account. In both cases
the parameter is insignificant. The estimate in column (3) hasa wide confidence interval, but the estimate in column (4) is
more precisely estimated and the confidence interval rules out
crowd-out in excess of 22% of the increase in contributions to
pension savings accounts. This indicates that a large part of the
contributions shown in Fig. 1 passes through to total savings during
the announcement period.
4. Conclusion
The announcement of a tax reform that reduces the marginal
tax rate creates a temporary incentive to increase savings in
tax deferred pension savings accounts during the announcement
period, i.e. the period where the policy change is made public
but not yet enacted. This is the first paper to document that
an announcement of a reduction in the marginal tax rate
generates higher savings in such pension accounts during the
C.T. Kreiner et al. / Economics Letters 150 (2017) 104–107 107announcement period. In addition, we find that the increase in
pension contributions passes through to total savings during the
announcement period, and that the effect is driven by less than 5%
of the people whowere affected by the policy change. Our analysis
cannot identify the long run effect on pension wealth, but we do
not observe any counteracting decrease in pension contributions
relative to the pre-announcement level up to 12 months after the
tax change took effect.
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